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Abstract 
Although an analysis of labor strikes can illuminate well the intersection 
between economic and political change, this mode of worker participation 
has rarely been the subject of systematic examination in the Latin American 
context. This article evaluates alternative explanations for variations in the 
frequency of strikes in Mexico between 1941 and 2012, focusing particularly 
on whether the virtual disappearance of strikes in federal-jurisdiction 
economic activities since the mid-1990s can be attributed to economic 
1 The author thanks Iván Besserer, Sam Kelly, and particularly Ian Ansin for their out-
standing research assistance. Graciela Bensusán, Víctor Manuel Durand Ponte, Russell L. 
Hanson, Eduardo Zepeda Miramontes, and several anonymous reviewers made insightful 
comments on earlier versions of this article. All translations of Spanish-language materials 
are by the author.
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stabilization, electoral democratization, or other factors.  Multivariate 
regression results and qualitative research fi ndings together show that 
effective control over infl ation and accompanying shifts in labor bargaining 
strategies best explain the notable decline in strikes. By highlighting the 
broad range of factors shaping labor mobilization, the article contributes 
to the comparative study of labor strikes and illustrates the value of strike 
analysis as a research strategy.
Key words: strikes, strikes in Mexico, economic stabilization, electoral 
democratization
Resumen
Aunque un análisis de las huelgas puede iluminar bien la interacción entre 
los procesos de cambio económico y político, esta forma de acción obrera 
pocas veces ha sido un enfoque de estudio sistemático en el contexto 
latinoamericano. Este artículo examina posibles explicaciones alternativas 
para la variación en el número de huelgas estalladas en México entre 1941 
y 2012, con un enfoque especial sobre las posibles razones (estabilización 
económica, democratización electoral u otros factores) por la caída notable 
en la frecuencia de las huelgas en actividades económicas de jurisdicción 
federal que se observa a partir de mediados de los años 1990. Los resultados 
combinados de un análisis multivariado y de una investigación cualitativa 
muestran que fue el control de la infl ación y, como consecuencia, los cambios 
que se dieron en las estrategias de negociación laboral los que ofrecen la 
mejor explicación por la notable caída en el número de huelgas. Con base 
en la evaluación de los múltiples factores que infl uyen en la movilización 
laboral, este artículo contribuye al análisis comparativo de las huelgas y 
muestra el valor del análisis de las huelgas como estrategia de investigación.
Palabras clave: huelgas, huelgas en México, estabilización económica, 
democratización electoral
Résumé
Alors que l’analyse des mouvements de grève permet de mettre en lumière 
les relations entre changement économique et politique, ce mode d’action 
des travailleurs a rarement fait l’objet d’une étude systématique dans le 
Revista Trabajo 14 CS6.indd   100 30/01/2017   01:20:43 p. m.
Eർඈඇඈආංർ Sඍൺൻංඅංඓൺඍංඈඇ, Eඅൾർඍඈඋൺඅ... Mංൽൽඅൾൻඋඈඈ඄ Kൾඏංඇ J. 101
contexte latino-américain. Cet article évalue différentes explications quant 
aux variations dans la fréquence des grèves au Mexique entre 1941 et 2012. 
Une attention toute particulière sera portée à la quasi-disparition des grèves, 
dans les activités économiques fédérales, depuis le milieu des années 1990 
afi n de voir si celle-ci peut être attribuée à une stabilisation économique, 
une démocratisation électorale, ou à d’autres facteurs. Les résultats de la 
régression multivariée, couplés aux résultats de la recherche qualitative, 
indiquent que le contrôle effi cace de l’infl ation, et les changements dans les 
stratégies de négociation dans le monde du travail qui l’accompagnèrent, 
sont les plus à même d’expliquer le déclin notable des grèves. En mettant 
en évidence le large éventail de facteurs infl uençant la mobilisation des 
travailleurs, cet article contribue à l’étude comparative des grèves du travail 
et illustre l’importance de l’analyse des grèves comme stratégie de recherche.
Mots-clés: mouvements de grève, mouvements de grève au Mexique, 
stabilisation économique, démocratisation électorale
Introduction
The strike is a key instrument that labor organizations can employ to defend 
workers’ immediate interests and, in some instances, to promote broader 
political and economic change.2 Winning the legal right to strike was a 
signal aspect of organized labor’s emergence as a sociopolitical force from 
the late nineteenth century onwards; its suppression or restoration has 
consistently been a core issue in the labor policies adopted by, respectively, 
authoritarian and democratic regimes. In Latin America, for example, 
the military dictatorships that seized power in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
and Uruguay between 1964 and 1976 systematically repressed worker 
mobilization; regaining the right to strike was a central element in the 
restoration of democracy in these countries (Drake, 1996: 29-56). Waves 
of strikes occurred throughout Latin America during the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries as workers organized themselves and fought for 
basic rights, but in subsequent decades there were great variations across 
the region in terms of their recourse to this form of collective action. For 
2 On the role of labor movements in democratic transitions, see Drake, 1996: 50-52, 104, 
107-8, 135, 170-71, 185-86; Bermeo, 1997: 310-12; Collier and Mahoney, 1997; Levitsky 
and Mainwaring,  2006.
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instance, between 1983 and 1986 there were forty-seven general strikes in 
Brazil in response to deteriorating economic conditions (Ibid.: table 3.8), 
yet there has been no general strike in Mexico since 1916.
Despite the importance of strikes, this mode of worker participation 
has rarely been the subject of systematic analysis in the Latin American 
context. There have, of course, been many studies of particular periods 
of labor militancy and especially important strike actions. Yet in notable 
contrast to recent scholarship on labor politics in Western European nations 
and some other countries (Robertson, 2007; Alemán, 2008; Lindvall, 2013; 
Hamann, Johnston, and Kelly, 2013a, 2013b), an extensive bibliographic 
search identifi ed only two national-level, cross-sectional logistic regression 
analyses of strikes in Latin America since the mid-1990s (Middlebrook, 
1995: 166-71; Picchetti, 2002). This lacuna may be partly due to problems 
of data availability or reliability. It might also refl ect a shift over time in the 
main focus of Latin American labor studies, away from such “traditional” 
topics as the causes of worker militancy and toward such subjects as gender 
issues in the workplace, the operation of informal employment markets, and 
the impact of economic globalization on labor standards. 
A focus on strikes does, however, illuminate well the intersection 
between political and economic change in Latin America (Kurtz, 2004: 
289; Etchemendy and Collier, 2007). Since the 1980s, a number of 
countries have experienced dual transitions—away from different forms of 
authoritarian rule toward electoral democracy, and away from state-centered 
development models toward market-led economic strategies. These shifts 
have often had somewhat contradictory consequences for labor movements. 
Democratization has usually favored worker organizations by reducing 
government repression, opening new opportunities to forge broad political 
and social alliances, sometimes permitting the progressive reform of labor 
legislation, and allowing unions to exercise the right to strike. Yet economic 
changes such as the closure of heavily unionized state-owned enterprises, 
industrial restructuring in private companies, substantial growth in the 
informal sector, and the proliferation of subcontracting arrangements have 
reduced the relative size of the unionized labor force and often undercut the 
bargaining leverage of worker organizations.
The Mexican case embodies several of these contradictory developments. 
Economic transformations since the 1980s have halved the unionized share 
of the economically active population (EAP) and weakened many labor 
organizations. Government policymakers’ successful control of consumer 
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price infl ation since 2000 may have reduced unions’ incentive to strike, but 
infl ation-adjusted minimum wages remain far below their peak in the late 
1970s. On the political front, government repression of worker protests 
generally declined as regime liberalization advanced from the early 1990s 
onward. However, the partisan change denoting regime transition involved 
the electoral defeat of the labor-allied Institutional Revolutionary Party 
(Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI) and the rise to national power 
of the center-right National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional, PAN). 
Despite persistent business lobbying, the PAN’s control over the presidency 
(2000-12) did not produce any signifi cant change in strike legislation.3 
Nevertheless, the PAN’s victory over the PRI in 2000 did raise the prospect 
that major labor organizations might actively mobilize against it. 
One of the ways in which Mexico departs from the regional pattern 
is the sharp decline in the number of labor strikes since the mid-1990s, a 
development that contrasts markedly with the experiences of other major 
Latin American countries.4 This article seeks to explain why labor strikes 
virtually disappeared in Mexico over this period. The analysis covers the 
seven-decade span between 1941 and 2012 in order to identify long-term 
trends and thereby establish an appropriate contextual basis on which to 
determine whether government success in controlling infl ation, electoral 
democratization (including a change in partisan control over the presidency), 
or other factors had a signifi cant impact on the frequency of strikes. The 
conclusions are based on both multivariate regression analyses of strike 
notices and strikes and a qualitative assessment of such factors as changes 
in labor movement leadership, organizational unity, and bargaining strategy.
3 The labor law reform adopted in November 2012 did not alter provisions regarding 
strikes (Bensusán and Middlebrook, 2013: 121).
4 Data on labor strikes in Latin America over the 1996-2013 period are available from the 
International Labor Organization (www.ilo.org/ilostat, “Strikes and Lockouts by Economic 
Activity,” consulted on September 2 and December 17, 2014), but they are quite incom-
plete for countries such as Argentina (where strikes generally increased over the 2006-13 
period) and Colombia (where there was minimal strike activity between 2002 and 2008). 
The number of strikes was comparatively high in Brazil between 1996 (1,258) and 2000 
(525), then declined, and slowly rose again after 2008 (reaching 873 strikes in 2012). There 
was no consistent pattern in Chile, where the number of strikes over the 1996-2013 period 
peaked in 2013 (201). Nor was there a consistent pattern in Peru, where strike numbers were 
generally low (although the incidence of strikes over the 2004-13 period was somewhat 
higher than in previous years).
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 Labor Strikes in Mexico: Principle versus Practice
Winning the right to strike in the 1917 Constitution (Article 123) was the 
emergent Mexican labor movement’s single most potent achievement. The 
liberal Constitution of 1857 had recognized workers’ right to withhold 
their labor as part of the free exercise of property rights. Nonetheless, the 
personalist authoritarian regime of Porfi rio Díaz (1876-80, 1884-1911) 
suppressed most industrial confl ict and repressed major strikes by mine, 
railroad, and textile workers in the years immediately preceding the outbreak 
of revolution in 1910. Even after the overthrow of the Díaz regime, strikers 
often faced harsh penalties. For example, although the sentence was not 
carried out, the leaders of a general strike initiated by electrical-power 
workers in Mexico City in July-August 1916 were sentenced to death 
under the terms of an executive decree prohibiting strikes in public services 
(Suarez-Potts, 2012: 13, 31-35, 40, 67-69, 124-25). The constitutional right 
to strike represented, then, a landmark departure.
In practice, however, in the years after the 1910-20 revolution both political 
leaders and private employers sought to limit strikes. The postrevolutionary 
political elite relied heavily on its alliance with the Mexican Regional Labor 
Confederation (Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana, CROM) to control 
labor mobilization. The CROM, founded in 1918, quickly came to dominate 
the organized labor movement and control key administrative institutions—
including most tripartite conciliation and arbitration boards (comprised of 
employer, government, and worker representatives) and, between 1924 and 
1928, the Ministry of Industry, Commerce, and Labor itself. In exchange for 
limiting strikes in the economic activities over which it held sway and ensuring 
stability in worker-employer relations (a policy that CROM leaders described 
as “an amnesty in the class struggle”), the government backed the CROM’s 
efforts to expand its membership and defeat its rivals in the labor movement 
(Bensusán, 2000: 107, 115-23, 128, 132, 135, 139, 195). The CROM lost 
its dominant position in the political crisis surrounding the assassination of 
former president Álvaro Obregón in 1928. Yet from the late 1940s onward 
the Confederation of Mexican Workers (Confederación de Trabajadores de 
México, founded in 1936) played a parallel role as the principal government 
labor ally regulating worker mobilization.5 
5 Since 1938 the CTM has been the PRI’s formal sector organization representing labor. 
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The goal of mediating strikes was also a major stimulus for the early 
development of state regulatory capacity over labor affairs. Moderating 
worker-employer confl icts was a key rationale for the development of state-
level conciliation and arbitration boards (juntas de conciliación y arbitraje) 
both during and after the Mexican Revolution, and even though President 
Plutarco Elías Calles (1924-28) lacked clear constitutional authority to do 
so, in 1927 he established the Federal Conciliation and Arbitration Board 
(Junta Federal de Conciliación y Arbitraje, JFCA) by decree in order to 
end a highly disruptive strike by railroad workers. A 1929 constitutional 
amendment subsequently established federal-government jurisdiction over 
labor affairs in strategically important industries and in economic activities 
with a particularly large labor force distributed across several states, a 
development that eased passage of a long-delayed Federal Labor Law (Ley 
Federal del Trabajo) in 1931 and led to the creation of the Ministry of Labor 
and Social Welfare (Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social, STPS) in 1940 
(Middlebrook, 1995: 49-52, 56-59).6 
This same duality—a recognition of the right to strike, accompanied 
by legal and administrative restrictions on the exercise of this right—
characterizes the provisions of federal law. Clause 18 of Article 123 defi ned 
the purposes for which workers could strike (“to achieve equilibrium among 
the diverse factors of production, harmonizing the rights of labor with those 
of capital”), and since 1931 federal labor law has further limited strikes to 
the suspension of work to achieve specifi c objectives (signing, revising, 
or enforcing a collective contract or an industry-wide labor agreement, 
and renegotiating contractually specifi ed wages).7 The union holding title 
6 The number of economic activities falling under the federal government’s legal ju-
risdiction grew steadily between 1929 and 1990 (Middlebrook, 1995: table 2.1). It came 
to include (in chronological order) railroads, federal-concession transportation activities, 
mining, hydrocarbons, marine and maritime-zone activities, the textile industry, electrical 
power generation, the cinematographic industry, the rubber industry, the sugar industry, 
companies operating under federal concession or contract or controlled directly by the fed-
eral government, petrochemicals, steel and metalworking, the cement industry, automobile 
manufacturing, the pharmaceutical industry, the pulp and paper industry, the food processing 
and bottling industries, the glass industry, tobacco processing, lime production, wood pro-
cessing, and banking. All other economic activities fall under the jurisdiction of individual 
states’ labor authorities, although they are bound by the terms of the Federal Labor Law.
7 An offi cially recognized union (but not an informal coalition of workers) can also 
suspend work in support of another legally sanctioned (existente) strike.
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to an existing contract or industry-wide agreement must present both the 
employer(s) and the appropriate federal- or local-jurisdiction (state-level) 
conciliation and arbitration board with a formal notice specifying the goals 
and time of the proposed strike action six days (ten days in the case of 
public-service employees) before suspending work. This notice or fi ling 
(emplazamiento) must satisfy a number of substantive and procedural 
requirements. Parties to the confl ict must also accept conciliation efforts 
by the board with which the notice was fi led. At any time within seventy-
two hours after the suspension of work, the employer or an interested third 
party may request that the conciliation and arbitration board declare the 
strike non-existent (inexistente), in which case the union may be required 
to demonstrate that the action has the support of the majority of workers 
employed in a given enterprise or workplace. If the board does declare the 
strike non-existent, then employees must return to work within twenty-
four hours or the employer can legally dismiss them and hire replacement 
workers. Requirements such as these provide state labor offi cials with 
administrative opportunities to delay or block strikes, if they choose to do 
so and are prepared to invest the political capital that such an action might 
require.8 
Nevertheless, the existence of legal authority and effective state capacity 
to regulate strikes does not necessarily preclude them from occurring. There 
has in fact been substantial variation over time in the number of strikes, in 
part because different presidential administrations have sometimes depended 
heavily on the support of labor allies during periods of economic or political 
crisis and at such times have hesitated to declare strike actions against private 
employers illegal or non-existent.9 It is signifi cant in this regard that, because 
of the highly presidentialist character of Mexico’s postrevolutionary regime, 
most previous scholarship has stressed the importance of presidential policy 
in determining the frequency of strikes. Indeed, the pioneering work by 
The requirements summarized in this paragraph were specifi ed in articles 440-51, 459, 
469, 920-38 of the 1970 federal labor law, which was in effect during the majority of years 
covered in the analysis below (Nueva Ley Federal del Trabajo, [1970] 1995). However, these 
provisions did not differ in substance from those in the 1931 labor law.
8 The absence of compulsory-arbitration provisions in Mexican labor law means that 
legally sanctioned strikes can last for a considerable time and have a highly negative impact 
on employers.
9 Author’s interview with a former senior JFCA and STPS offi cial, Mexico City, June 
26, 2015.
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Pablo González Casanova concluded that “Presidential policy—in its broad 
tendencies—determines whether there is a larger or smaller number of strikes 
and strikers” (González Casanova, 1965: 27-28). Yet studies by González 
Casanova and later researchers sometimes included unreliable data, and 
they generally did not differentiate between federal- and local-jurisdiction 
strikes. With the exception of the author’s earlier examination of strikes 
between 1938 and 1993 (Middlebrook, 1995: 162-72), no previous study 
has included a multivariate regression analysis of the impact of presidential 
labor policy and selected economic variables on strike activity.10 
An Analysis of Strike Activity in Mexico, 1941-2012
Because government-reported data on the frequency of strike notices and 
strikes are the most reliable measures of labor mobilization, the aggregate 
number of notices and strikes has long been the principal focus of both 
political debate and academic analysis in Mexico. This analysis centers on 
these same measures.11 Information regarding federal- and local-jurisdiction 
strikes is generally available over the entire period between 1938 and 2012. 
However, the availability of data concerning strike notifi cations is more 
limited; for federal-jurisdiction industries, it is missing for the 1946-62 
period and for 1966, and for local-jurisdiction economic activities it is only 
10 Both González Casanova (table 3) and Wilkie (1973: table 8.2) included in their 
analyses strike data beginning in 1920. However, before 1938 government statistics omitted 
some strikes for political reasons (Carr, 1976: vol. 2, 41; Bensusán, 2000: 147 n93), and 
they did not always differentiate between strike notices and actual strikes (Middlebrook, 
1995: 163). Although Zapata Schaffeld (2007: 122-24) reported only six-year averages of 
strikes and strikers between 1934 and 2003 and did not distinguish between strike activity 
in federal- and local-jurisdiction economic activities, he did seek to correlate variations in 
strike activity with changes in infl ation, real minimum-wage trends, and shifts in the size 
of the socially insured and economically active populations. Kurtz (2004: fi g. 1[a]) graphed 
the number of strikes against shifts in an economic liberalization index over the 1971-1994 
period. The discussion below notes where the specifi c fi ndings presented here differ from 
those of previous studies.
11 Government sources do not report wildcat strikes (paros).
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available for the 1980-2011 period.12 Information concerning other measures 
of strike activity is even more limited.13
For practical reasons, this analysis focuses exclusively on federal-
jurisdiction strike notices and strikes. Federal authorities have a far more 
consistent record of reliably recording these data than do state-level labor 
offi ces. Moreover, even though local-jurisdiction authorities are bound by 
federal labor law, there is variation in state governments’ labor policies and 
little experience (except in specifi c, high-level labor confl icts) of federal 
authorities seeking to coordinate them.14 These factors make it diffi cult to 
formulate meaningful hypotheses concerning possible political explanations 
12 Since 1983 the STPS has published detailed information concerning the stated reasons 
for both federal-jurisdiction strike notices and strikes, including demands to sign or revise 
a collective contract or an industry-wide contract law, correct alleged violations of contract 
terms, or achieve “equilibrium” between capital and labor (the legal phrase employed to 
describe economic demands), as well as which major labor organizations fi led them.
13 For federal-jurisdiction industries, data concerning the number of workers on strike 
and estimated fi nancial losses attributable to strikes are available for the 1938-62 period; data 
regarding the number of workers on strike and workdays lost to strikes are available for the 
1989-2012 period. For the earlier period, see Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social, Me-
moria de labores, various years; for the later period, see www.stps.gob.mx (“Emplazamientos 
y huelgas,” table V.1). For local-jurisdiction economic activities, data concerning the number 
of workers on strike and estimated fi nancial losses attributable to strikes are only available 
for the 1938-58 period; see Secretaría de Industria y Comercio, Anuario estadístico de los 
Estados Unidos Mexicanos, various years.
In his seminal analysis of labor strikes in Western Europe, Hibbs (1978: 156) advocated 
employing strike “volume” (the product of the size, duration, and frequency of strikes) as 
the dependent variable.  However, the dependent variable chosen for this analysis is the 
number of strikes because data equivalent to those employed by Hibbs are only available 
for the 1989-2012 period. Even for this relatively short period, the available data regarding 
workdays lost to strikes each year may be unreliable because they are based on voluntary 
reporting by unions and employers—which have incentives to, respectively, overstate or 
underreport the number of workers on strike.  Moreover, restricting the analysis to the 1989-
2012 period would greatly limit variability in an important independent variable (presidential 
labor policy) and, because of the much shorter time span, reduce the statistical signifi cance of 
the results. Similar data problems may explain why statistical analyses of strikes elsewhere 
in Latin America (and in developing countries more generally) have also focused on strike 
frequency, rather than strike volume. See, for example, Picchetti, 2002:181-82 and Segalla, 
1995. Huber Stephens (1983: 75) compiled Peruvian strike data along lines advocated by 
Hibbs for the1965-75 period, but she did not perform a regression analysis.
14 Author’s interview with a former senior JFCA and STPS offi cial, Mexico City, June 
26, 2015.
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for variations in the incidence of strike notices or strikes across Mexico’s 
thirty-one states and the Federal District during the 1941-2012 period.
Because presidential labor policy is such an important potential infl uence 
on the incidence of strikes, the regression analysis presented in this section 
examines trends over twelve full six-year presidential terms (the 1941-2012 
period). The administrations holding offi ce during these years varied in terms 
of their overall labor policies, which can be characterized as conservative, 
moderate, or liberal based on their social welfare programs for workers, 
their openness toward politically independent labor organizations, and 
the political representation of labor in the federal Chamber of Deputies.15 
Only President Luis Echeverría Álvarez (1970-76) pursued what may be 
broadly characterized as liberal policies toward labor. The administrations 
of Manuel Ávila Camacho (1940-46), Miguel Alemán (1946-52), Gustavo 
Díaz Ordaz (1964-70), Miguel de la Madrid (1982-88), Carlos Salinas de 
Gortari (1988-94), Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León (1994-2000), and Felipe 
Calderón Hinojosa (2006-12) basically took a conservative line on labor 
policy. Four administrations adopted more moderate labor policies: Adolfo 
15 During the period in which the successors to the “offi cial” Revolutionary National Party 
(Partido Nacional Revolucionario, founded in 1929)—the Party of the Mexican Revolution 
(Partido de la Revolución Mexicana, PRM, 1938) and the PRI (1946)—exercised strong 
electoral dominance, the proportion of labor representatives in the PRM/PRI’s delegation 
in the lower chamber of Congress constituted one measure of organized labor’s political 
standing. Decisions regarding the composition of the PRM/PRI delegation were a presidential 
prerogative (Middlebrook, 1995: 101-2; Zapata Schaffeld, 2007: 114).
The three policy areas selected as a basis on which to characterize different administra-
tions’ overall labor policies were all coded 0-2: social welfare policies (no change in existing 
social-welfare legislation or privatization of public-welfare programs; slight expansion; subs-
tantial expansion); government openness toward politically independent labor organizations 
(hostile, neutral, tolerant or supportive); and the labor delegation’s share of total seats in the 
federal Chamber of Deputies (decrease, stable, increase). Cumulative scores of 0-2, 3, and 
4-6 were categorized, respectively, as conservative, moderate, and liberal. Because labor’s 
congressional representation ceased to be a relevant criterion following the PRI’s loss of the 
presidency in 2000, it was dropped for the 2000-12 period and the three classifi cations were 
assigned, respectively, to cumulative scores of 0-1, 2, and 3-4. The sources consulted were: 
for social welfare policies, Dion, 2010: 68-72, 93-94, 98-99, 102, 107-8, 119, 121-22, 133-37, 
182-83, 188, 205, 207-9, and fi g. 6.1; for policies toward independent labor organizations, 
Middlebrook, 1995: 160-61; Samstad, 2002: 13-16, Bensusán and Middlebrook, 2013: 93-
95; for labor’s congressional representation, Middlebrook,1995: table 3.1 (data for 1976-79 
are missing) and Bensusán and Middlebrook, 2013: table 5.
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Ruiz Cortines (1952-58), Adolfo López Mateos (1958-64), José López 
Portillo (1976-82), and Vicente Fox Quesada (2000-06).
Long-term Economic and Political Determinants 
of Strike Activity
What economic and/or political factors have determined the incidence 
of federal-jurisdiction strike notices and strikes in Mexico over the long 
term? 
The number of strike notices that labor organizations fi led annually 
varied greatly over the 1941-2012 period, ranging from a low of 117 in 
1941 to a high of 16,141 in 1987 (see the Statistical Appendix, which 
presents the original data set compiled for this article). However, the 
volume of fi lings did not vary proportionally with shifts in the size of either 
the unionized labor force or the EAP as a whole; indeed, the total number 
was substantially higher in 1982 than it was in 1992, 2002, or 2012. The 
total number of unionized workers stagnated over the 1992-2002 period, 
but a signifi cant decrease in the number of strike notices preceded this 
change.16 The EAP continued to expand over the entire 1941-2012 period.17 
Considerable variation over time in the annual incidence of notices, as well 
as the fact that the number of fi lings peaked during years of impending 
economic crisis (1982 and 1987),18 suggest that other economic and/or 
political considerations shaped labor organizations’ decisions to fi le strike 
notices. 
The results of a Prais-Winsten iterative least-squares regression show 
that change in the rate of infl ation was the strongest determinant of 
variation in the annual number of strike notices in federal-jurisdiction 
16 The size of the unionized labor force may have fluctuated during the 1980s as a con-
sequence of job losses in the heavily unionized public sector and in private fi rms. However, 
the available data indicate that the number of unionized workers grew from 3,429,813 in 
1978 to 4,116,920 in 1992. See, respectively, Zazueta and de la Peña, 1984: table 2.4, and 
Bensusán and Middlebrook, 2013: table 2.
17 INEGI, 2010: tables 5.3, 5.4, 5.5.
18 The CTM co-ordinated mass strike fi lings as the rate of infl ation spiked in 1954, 1983, 
and 1984 (Middlebrook, 1995: 218, 260, 262).
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economic activities between 1941 and 2012 (Table 1).19 The model tested 
the signifi cance of the economic variables most likely to infl uence labor 
organizations’ decisions to fi le notices of their intention to strike (the 
annual rate of consumer price infl ation, the infl ation-adjusted value of 
the legal minimum wage, and the infl ation-adjusted growth rate of gross 
domestic product) and a key political variable, presidential labor policy 
(whether a particular administration’s overall policy toward labor was 
conservative, liberal, or moderate).20 Of these possible determinants of 
variations in the incidence of strike notices, only infl ation had a statistically 
signifi cant (at the p < 0.001 level) effect. The estimated coeffi cient of this 
variable indicates that an increase of one percentage point in the rate of 
inflation was associated with a 0.46 percent increase in the number of 
federal-jurisdiction strike notices.
19 The statistical analyses discussed in this article all employed the Prais-Winsten 
itera-tive least-squares technique to correct for autocorrelation of the time-series data. All 
strike data are grouped by full calendar years because a new presidential administration 
offi cially begins late in a given year (December 1) and information concerning the month 
in which notices were fi led and strikes occurred is not readily available for the years 
before 1989. Thus, the data attributed to the Echeverría administration, for example, are 
those pertaining to 1971 through 1976.
20 The sources for the economic data employed here are detailed in the Statistical 
Appendix. The analysis includes a real minimum wage index because no other wage data 
are consistently available over the entire 1941-2012 period. For evidence concerning the 
generally positive relationship between offi cial minimum wages and overall wage trends 
in Mexico, see Fairris, Popli, and Zepeda, 2008.
The selection of the economic and political independent variables employed in these 
regressions parallels other scholars’ statistical analyses of labor strikes, but it does not 
include the unemployment rate in Mexico. There are serious problems with the overall 
reliability of these data before the early 1970s. Moreover, the absence of unemployment 
insurance in a country with a high incidence of poverty means that, rather than face open 
unemployment, workers are generally prepared to accept lower quality jobs, seek 
employment in the informal sector, or even work without remuneration, making the rate of 
open unemployment a poor indicator of macroeconomic conditions. The government’s 
broad defi nition of employment (those individuals who worked—even without 
remuneration—at least one hour during the week they were surveyed) also contributes to 
reported unemployment rates that are often arbitrarily low. See Gregory, 1986: 66-69, 97, 
and Lustig, 1998: 71, 75, 78.
Data limitations also precluded including in this analysis a variable representing shifts 
over time in the size of the unionized labor force. Similarly, data regarding the number 
of registered federal-jurisdiction unions are not consistently available prior to 2008. 
However, annual variations in the number of registered unions between 2008 (1,296) and 
2012 (1,556) did not correspond to shifts in the volume of strike notices. STPS internal 
document, July 2015.
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Table 1: Analysis of Covariance in the Incidence of Federal-
Jurisdiction Strike Notices, 1941-2012
Variable Estimated Coeffi cient Standard Error T-value
Infl ation rate (logged) 0.46 0.14   3.35a
Presidential labor policy 
        Conservative -0.30 0.32 -0.93
  Liberal -0.23 0.50 -0.46
Minimum wage -0.01 0.01 -0.17
Gross domestic product        -0.02 0.02 -1.03
Constant 7.41 0.85    8.68a
R2 = 0.42
Adjusted R2 = 0.36
N = 54
Degrees of freedom = 48
Durbin-Watson statistic = 1.86
Note: The analysis employed the Prais-Winsten iterative least-squares 
technique to correct for serial autocorrelation among independent variables. 
aSignifi cant at the p < 0.001 level.
The variance in strike notices explained by the model depicted in Table 1 
is modest but respectable (an adjusted R-squared of 0.36) given the relatively 
small number of observations available (N = 54).21 This may refl ect the fact 
that a union’s decision to fi le a strike notice is sometimes motivated by factors 
unrelated to economic conditions (for instance, a demand that an employer sign 
a collective contract or correct alleged contract violations). One notable such 
instance occurred in 1973-74 when the PRI-allied Confederation of Mexican 
Workers urged its affi liates to fi le notices en masse to protest the Echeverría 
administration’s support for politically independent unions and its (temporary) 
hostility toward the CTM (Middlebrook, 1995: 171).22 Nevertheless, the 
21 The absence of data on federal-jurisdiction strike notices between 1946 and 1962 
reduced the size of N.
22 Dion (2010: 158, 161-64) argues that labor organizations also employed strike notices 
as part of their mobilization strategy to win government concessions on social insurance 
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regression results strongly suggest that, over the entire 1941-2012 period, 
labor organizations in federal-jurisdiction industries fi led larger numbers of 
strike notices when rising infl ation threatened workers’ economic welfare. 
A provision in the Federal Labor Law (article 924) that protects workers by 
freezing an employer’s assets as soon as a strike notice is fi led (thus preventing 
the company from liquidating fi nancial reserves that it may owe its employees 
for back wages or other considerations) constitutes an important institutional 
incentive for unions to do so during periods of economic crisis.23
Because fi ling a strike notice is a relatively simple procedure, one would 
not expect government labor offi cials to have much control over union 
actions in this area. The regression results reported in Table 1 show that, 
indeed, variations in presidential labor policy had no statistically signifi cant 
impact on the incidence of strike notices in federal-jurisdiction economic 
activities over the 1941-2012 period. The strong relationship between the 
rate of infl ation and the incidence of notices indicates that unions have 
historically exercised considerable autonomy in their decisions to fi le strike 
notices as part of their demand-making.
There is, however, evidence of government control over actual labor 
strikes. Table 2 presents the results of Prais-Winsten regressions (employing 
the same economic and political independent variables as in the regression 
analyses of strike notices) analyzing variations in the incidence of federal-
jurisdiction strikes over the 1941-2012 period. Differences in presidential labor 
policy had no statistically signifi cant impact on variations in the frequency 
of strikes during these years.24 However, this does not necessarily mean that 
presidential labor policy was irrelevant in this regard. To the contrary, this 
fi nding indicates consistency across different presidential administrations 
in state offi cials’ efforts to control labor mobilization in these strategically 
important economic activities, whether by direct (through intensive conciliation 
coverage. However, no other analyst of Mexican labor politics makes this claim.
23 Author’s interview with a senior JFCA offi cial, Mexico City, June 23, 2015.
24 A Prais-Winsten regression analysis also found that differences in presidential labor 
policy had no statistically signifi cant impact on variations in the proportion of all federal-ju-
risdiction strike notices that eventuated in strikes over the 1941-2012 period.
 A separate regression analysis of the incidence of total strikes (that is, federal- and lo-
cal-jurisdiction strikes combined) also found that presidential labor policy had no statistically 
signifi cant impact. Of the three independent economic variables (the annual rate of consumer 
price infl ation, the infl ation-adjusted value of the legal minimum wage, and the infl ation-
adjusted growth rate of gross domestic product) tested, only infl ation had a signifi cant impact. 
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of worker-employer disputes or the manipulation of administrative restrictions 
on the right to strike) or indirect (through the restraint of labor organizations 
aligned politically with the government) means.25 The signs of the presidential-
policy variables reported in Table 2 do suggest that liberal and conservative 
administrations may have differed somewhat from each other, but during the 
period under examination neither liberal nor conservative presidencies had 
an impact on strikes that differed signifi cantly in statistical terms from that 
of moderate administrations (represented by the constant). 
Table 2: Analysis of Covariance in the Incidence of Federal-
Jurisdiction Strikes, 1941-2012
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Infl ation rate (logged) -- 0.44 (0.12)a 0.29 (0.14)b
Strike notices (logged) 0.40 (0.13)a -- 0.22 (0.13)
Presidential labor policy
     Conservative -0.50 (0.31) -0.55 (0.30) -0.55 (0.31)
  Liberal 0.26 (0.58) 0.24 (0.51) 0.18 (0.55)
Minimum wage -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
Gross domestic product -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02)
Constant 1.59 (1.32) 3.72 (0.74)a 2.31 (1.29)
R2 0.39 0.35 0.39
Adjusted R2  0.32 0.28 0.31
N 53 53 53
47 47 46Degrees of freedom 
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.77 1.81 1.83
Note: The analysis employed the Prais-Winsten iterative least-squares 
technique to correct for serial autocorrelation among independent variables.
The table presents estimated coefficientes, with standard errors in parentheses.
bSignifi cant at the p < 0.05 level.
25 This fi nding supports the conclusions reached by Middlebrook (1995:171) and, im-
plicitly, Zapata Schaffeld (2007: 122, 127).
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There was a reasonably close relationship between changes in the number 
of federal-jurisdiction strike notices and the incidence of strikes over most 
of the 1941-2012 period (Figure 1), yet what underpinned this link was 
the strong relationship between variations in the rate of infl ation and the 
incidence of strikes—a relationship not identifi ed in any previous analysis 
of labor strikes in Mexico.26
Figure 1: Federal-jurisdiction Strike Notices, Strikes, and Infl ation 
Rate (standardized), 1941-2012
Source: Statistical Appendix.
Table 2 compares the results of three Prais-Winsten regression models 
analyzing federal strike activity during these years. All three models include 
as independent variables presidential labor policy, the infl ation-adjusted 
value of the legal minimum wage, and the infl ation-adjusted growth rate 
of gross domestic product. However, Model 1 includes a variable for the 
number of strike notices fi led in a given year (logged), Model 2 drops 
notices and includes the rate of infl ation (logged), and Model 3 includes both 
strike-notice and infl ation independent variables. Models 1 and 2 confi rm 
26 This fi nding differs from the conclusions reached by Basurto, 1962: 56, 58, 60, 101, 
103; González Casanova, 1965: 27 n6; Wilkie, 1973:187; Middlebrook, 1995: 166, 169; 
Zapata Schaffeld, 2007: 123-24; and Bensusán and Middlebrook, 2013: 33, none of whom 
identifi ed any consistent relationship between economic variables and strike frequency.
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the preceding discussion by demonstrating that both the volume of strike 
notices and the rate of infl ation are positively associated with the frequency 
of strikes. Yet when both of these predictors are included in Model 3, the 
signifi cance of strike notices is sharply reduced. Strong collinearity between 
infl ation and strike notices (r = 0.40) reduces the signifi cance of strike 
notices, but despite the effects of multicollinearity on the signifi cance of the 
predictors, Model 3 represents unbiased point estimates for both variables. 
In this model, it is infl ation, not strike notices, that exerts the signifi cant and 
substantively larger effect on the incidence of strikes. Substantively, one 
can say that a one-standard-deviation increase in the rate of infl ation results 
in an increase of around one-third of a standard deviation in the incidence 
of strikes, all else equal. In contrast, a one-standard-deviation increase 
in logged strike notices results in an increase of about one-quarter of a 
standard deviation in the incidence of strikes, all else equal—and the effect 
is statistically nonsignifi cant in the model. Directly comparing the magnitude 
of these effects indicates, then, that the infl ation rate has a stronger overall 
effect than strike notices on the incidence of strikes.
These results shed further light on (and partially qualify the established 
scholarly consensus regarding) the question of political control over labor 
mobilization in Mexico. As noted above, there is evidence that successive 
presidential administrations—regardless of the overall character of their 
labor policies—sought to limit strikes in strategically important federal-
jurisdiction economic activities. The decline in the number of strikes in 
1987-88, even as Mexico recorded the highest rates of infl ation since 
the 1910-20 revolution, illustrates this point particularly well (Statistical 
Appendix). However, the fact that infl ation remained a statistically signifi cant 
determinant of variations in strike frequency across the entire 1941-2012 
period qualifi es this conclusion in one way: despite their efforts to limit 
strikes, different administrations were either compelled to make concessions 
to labor organizations or were unable to prevent some strikes from taking 
place when infl ationary pressures intensifi ed.
Assessing the Impact of Electoral Democratization 
and Economic Stabilization on Labor Mobilization 
The preceding discussion has focused on the 1941-2012 period as a whole. 
However, as the introduction indicated, the Mexican case is notable within 
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a comparative Latin American context because of the sharp fall in—and the 
continued low number of—strikes since the mid-1990s. What political and/
or economic factors might have accounted for this development?
There is no evidence that either electoral democratization per se or 
partisan change in control over the presidency had any substantial impact on 
the incidence of strikes in federal-jurisdiction industries. Mexico’s lengthy 
process of political liberalization accelerated after the late 1980s, and in 1996 
the Zedillo administration adopted a major political reform that facilitated 
electoral gains by opposition parties. However, in a telling example of the 
disjuncture that has generally existed between electoral democratization 
and the character of state-labor relations in Mexico, the labor policies that 
Zedillo adopted in the wake of the devastating 1994-95 fi nancial crisis 
were largely conservative. In fact, fewer strikes took place under Zedillo 
(277) than during the preceding Salinas de Gortari administration (831) 
(Statistical Appendix). Following partisan change at the national level 
in 2000, there was initially considerable speculation that PRI-affi liated 
unions might employ strikes to challenge the new PAN government, but 
the Fox administration quickly reached an accommodation with major labor 
organizations (Bensusán and Middlebrook, 2013: 51). Its overall labor 
policies were moderate. Nevertheless, the total number of strikes taking 
place during Fox’s six-year term remained low (267).27 
Might there have been an economic cause for the decline in the frequency 
of strikes after the mid-1990s? Because of the historically strong relationship 
between the rate of infl ation and the incidence of both strike notices and 
strikes, one might hypothesize that the government’s success in controlling 
27 Statistical Appendix. The regression analyses reported here of the incidence of fed-
eral-jurisdiction strike notices and strikes do not include a dummy variable distinguishing 
between the PRI (1941-2000) and PAN (2001-12) eras because an examination of the 
1941-2012 period had already determined that the variable representing presidential labor 
policy was not statistically signifi cant. Although the models included a dummy variable for 
infl ation-control during the 2000-12 period, a dummy variable representing the PAN era 
(2001-12) was omitted because of almost perfect collinearity.
Professor Todd Landman (University of Essex) conducted a separate regression analysis 
of the author’s strike data employing the Polity IV index of political regime characteristics 
(“Authority Trends, 1946-2013: Mexico,” at www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm) as 
an independent variable. He found no statistically signifi cant relationship between political 
liberalization/democratization over the 1946-2012 period and the frequency of federal-
jurisdiction strikes. Author’s communication with Landman, March 3, 2015.
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infl ation after 1999 (Statistical Appendix) would have a notable impact in 
these areas. Indeed, a Prais-Winsten regression employing a dummy variable 
representing the 2000-12 post-infl ation control period found no statistically 
signifi cant relationship between infl ation and strike notices during these 
years, and a visual representation of the impact of changes in the infl ation 
rate on the predicted incidence of federal-jurisdiction strike notices shows 
a considerable difference in this relationship between the 1941-1999 and 
2000-12 periods (Figure 2).28 In the left-hand graph (the 1941-1999 period), 
the number of notices (on a logged scale) increases substantially as the 
rate of infl ation (on a logged scale) rises. In the right-hand graph depicting 
the relationship during the 2000-12 period, the confi dence intervals are 
fairly large, indicating a higher degree of uncertainty than for the 1941-99 
period. Nevertheless, increases in the rate of infl ation appear to have had 
very little impact on the number of strike notices fi led during these years. 
The evidence suggests, then, that infl ation mattered less as a predictor of 
federal-jurisdiction strike notices once the annual rate fell to single digits.29
28 The predicted incidences of strike notices and strikes (and their 95 percent confi dence 
intervals) in Figures 2-4 are based on computations of linear combinations of regression 
model estimated coeffi cients.
29 The curbing of infl ation also had some impact on the proportion of federal-jurisdiction 
strike notices making economic demands. That proportion was largest—ranging from 78.4 
to 85.1 percent—during a period of high infl ation between 1983 and 1987, and a comparison 
of cross-correlograms (portrayals of changes in the cross-correlation between the infl ation 
rate and the economic-demand proportion of all strike notices) for the 1983-99 and 2000-12 
periods showed a much closer relationship between the rate of infl ation and the proportion 
of strike notices focused on economic demands during the former period than during the 
latter period. For the 1983-99 period, the proportion of economic-type strike notices was 
fairly strongly correlated with the contemporaneous rate of infl ation; that is, there was a 
strong relationship between the variables (r = 0.70) at a time lag of 0. In the 2000-12 period, 
the correlation was much weaker both contemporaneously and across time lags. However, 
a marked, consistent decline in the proportion of notices making economic demands only 
came after 2004; over the 2007-12 period the proportion ranged from 27.8 to 34.9 percent. 
Author’s calculations based on data presented in STPS, www.stps.gob.mx, “Emplazamientos 
y huelgas,” table V.2.1, consulted on September 3, 2014; data regarding the stated causes of 
strike notices and strikes are only available for the 1983-2012 period. 
The 2000-12 period was not the fi rst time that the Mexican government succeeded in 
controlling the rate of consumer price infl ation; it had also done so between 1959 and 1972 
(Statistical Appendix). The author therefore conducted a further regression analysis of the 
possible impact of infl ation control on the incidence of strike notices using a dummy variable 
representing an expanded infl ation-control period (1959-72 and 2000-12). In this test, the 
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Figure 2: Predicted Incidence of Federal-jurisdiction Strike Notices 
as Infl ation Rate Changes, Pre- and Post-Infl ation Control
Figure 3: Predicted Incidence of Federal-jurisdiction Strikes as 
Strike Notices Change, Pre- and Post-Infl ation Control
variable representing interaction between infl ation and infl ation control reversed sign (whe-
reas as predicted, it had been negative when the interaction variable encompassed only the 
2000-12 period, it became positive when the variable included both the 1959-72 and 2000-12 
periods), suggesting that the 2000-12 period of infl ation control had a substantially different 
impact on the incidence of federal-jurisdiction strike notices than the 1959-72 period. One 
possible explanation for this difference is that labor organizations perceived the government’s 
commitment to infl ation control to be more credible in the later period.   
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Figure 4: Predicted Incidence of Federal-jurisdiction Strikes as 
Infl ation Changes, Pre- and Post-Infl ation Control
Note: Dotted lines in Figures 2-4 indicate 95% confi dence intervals.
The government’s effective control over infl ation also undermined 
the long-established linkage between strike notices and strikes in federal-
jurisdiction economic activities. Indeed, the volume of notices remained 
quite constant from the mid-1990s through 2012, even after a substantial fall 
in the number of strikes. This change is apparent in Figure 1 and particularly 
in Figure 3, which depicts the predicted number of strikes resulting from 
changes in the number of notices. The upward slope of the line in the left-
hand graph indicates a positive relationship between notices and strikes 
in the pre-infl ation control period (1941-1999), whereas the downward 
slope of the line in the right-hand graph illustrates a negative relationship 
between these two variables during the 2000-12 period (although the very 
wide confi dence intervals indicate a low degree of certainty regarding the 
slope of this line across much of the range).30
30 A comparison of cross-correlograms (graphic portrayals of changes in the cross-
correlation between the incidence of federal-jurisdiction notices and strikes) for the pre- and 
post-infl ation control periods confi rmed this conclusion. The cross-correlogram for the 1941-
99 period showed a strong positive correlation between notices and strikes (r = 0.54) at a 
time lag of 0, meaning that notices and strikes were interrelated at each point in time and that 
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In contrast, the relationship between infl ation and strikes persisted during 
the infl ation-control period, although it was weaker than during the 1941-
1999 period. The upward slope of the lines in Figure 4 (depicting the 
predicted number of federal-jurisdiction strikes resulting from changes in 
the infl ation rate) indicates that, both before and after government economic 
authorities succeeded in reducing the rate of infl ation to single digits, the 
rate of infl ation helped determine the incidence of strikes.31  However, the 
wide confi dence levels in the graph for the 2000-12 period suggest that the 
relationship might have become weaker.32 
Supplemental Explanations for the (Virtual) Disappearance 
of Strikes in Mexico
Although regression analysis sheds invaluable light on key economic and 
political variables potentially infl uencing the incidence of labor strikes 
in Mexico, this methodology cannot readily illuminate all the possible 
factors that might account for the marked decline in strikes since the mid-
neither series infl uenced the other in future periods. In sharp contrast, the cross-correlogram 
for the 2000-12 period showed that notices and strikes were inversely correlated at a time lag 
of 0, meaning that notices and strikes became decoupled during the infl ation-control period.
31 See also the author’s interview with a former senior JFCA and STPS offi cial, Mexico 
City, June 26, 2015.
32 A multivariate logistic regression employing a dummy variable representing the 
2000-12 post-infl ation control period confi rmed that, even though there was a substantial 
decrease in the number of strikes during these years, the statistically signifi cant relationship 
between the infl ation rate and the incidence of strikes persisted. Cross-correlograms for the 
pre- and post-infl ation control periods also showed positive correlations at conventional 
lag intervals, with some evidence that the incidence of federal-jurisdiction strikes was less 
strongly infl uenced by changes in the infl ation rate after 2000.
Data concerning the proportion of all strikes taking place for economic reasons (that 
is, those strikes seeking the revision of a collective contract or industry-wide agreement, a 
salary increase, or an adjustment in “factor equilibrium”) over the 1983-2012 period offer 
further support for these conclusions. As in the case of strike notices, this proportion was 
generally highest during the 1980s, ranging from 47.2 percent in 1985 to 67.6 percent in 
1986. The proportion declined substantially during the 2000-12 infl ation-control period (it 
was only 25.0 percent in 2007), but it jumped to 63.2 percent in 2009 and 53.9 percent in 
2011. Author’s calculations based on data presented in STPS (www.stps.gob.mx), “Empla-
zamientos y huelgas,” table V.3.1 (consulted on September 3, 2014).
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1990s. This subsection considers additional possible explanations for this 
phenomenon, focusing on shifts in the unionization rate and the organized 
labor movement’s sectorial composition and on such qualitative factors 
as the labor movement’s leadership, organizational unity, and bargaining 
strategy.33 There were no revisions in the legal regime governing strikes that 
might account for their reduced frequency during this period. 
The most conspicuous of these shifts was a substantial decline in the 
unionization rate, the proportion of the workforce that is unionized.  The 
unionized share of the EAP aged 14 and older (the minimum legal working 
age in Mexico prior to 2015) fell from 16.3 percent in 1978 to 13.6 percent 
in 1992 and 10.4 percent in 1994; the proportion then remained quite 
constant through 2010 (9.0 percent) before declining further to 8.8 percent 
in 2012 (Bensusán and Middlebrook, 2013: tables 2, 3). This substantial 
drop was the consequence of far-reaching industrial restructuring in both 
the public and private sectors in the aftermath of Mexico’s 1982 debt crisis 
(a process that included closing many unionized state-owned enterprises 
or sharply reducing their workforces prior to their sale to private investors) 
and signifi cant growth over time in the size of the informal sector (Ibid.: 
53 n25). It is probable that such a major decline in the unionization rate 
reduced labor’s overall mobilizational capacity. However, because union 
membership in Mexico is more frequently a condition of employment than 
a voluntary commitment (Ibid.: 31 n31), the unionization rate per se is not 
necessarily a reliable predictor of unions’ capacity to mobilize to defend 
their interests.
Important shifts in the sectorial composition of the labor movement 
accompanied, and in some instances contributed to, a decline in the 
unionization rate. The proportion of the unionized workforce employed 
in manufacturing activities fell to 21.5 percent in 2012, while the share 
of the unionized labor force employed in the services sector rose to 
70.7 percent that same year (Ibid.: table 3). Much of the employment 
growth in manufacturing that occurred after the 1980s was in the so-
called maquiladora (in-bond processing) industry concentrated along 
the Mexico-U.S. border. Unionization rates in almost all of this industry 
have historically been low, and many of the maquildadora unions that 
do exist are company-controlled organizations formed specifi cally to 
33 The absence of adequate statistical measures made it impractical to include these 
different factors in the regression analyses discussed in preceding sections of this article.
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prevent workers from forming representative unions willing to defend 
their interests (De la O, 2006). 
There were also major changes in the labor movement’s leadership and 
unity after the mid-1990s. The most important event in this regard was the 
death in 1997 of Fidel Velázquez Sánchez, the infl uential secretary-general 
(1941-47, 1950-97) of the powerful CTM. Velázquez’s successors, Leonardo 
Rodríguez Alcaine (1997-2005) and Joaquín Gamboa Pascoe (2006-16), lacked 
his charisma and negotiating skills,34 and Rodríguez Alcaine could not block a 
serious schism within the Labor Congress (Congreso del Trabajo, CT, formed 
in 1966 to unify the labor movement) the year Velázquez died. A substantial 
bloc of CT affi liates seceded to form the National Union of Workers (Unión 
Nacional de Trabajadores, UNT) in 1997 (Samstad, 2002: 13-4, Bizberg, 
2003: 31-3). They did so primarily because of growing differences of opinion 
regarding how to confront the challenges posed by industrial restructuring 
in the workplace and a substantial shift in government policies toward labor 
following the adoption of market-focused economic policies in the 1980s.
These changes in the composition, leadership, and organizational structure 
of the labor movement eroded its overall infl uence, but they do not account 
well for variations over time in the incidence of federal-jurisdiction strikes. 
There was, for example, no clear relationship between leadership change 
in the CTM—which, despite some decline in its total membership between 
1997 and 2008 (Bensusán and Middlebrook, 2013: 64), remained Mexico’s 
largest labor confederation—and its strike record. In fact, the annual number 
of CTM-initiated strikes declined quite consistently over the 1983-2012 
period, from highs of 139 in 1984 and 219 in 1986 to just 2 in 2009. Its 
share of all federal-jurisdiction strikes (which averaged 57.5 percent over 
the 1983-2012 period, with a peak of 70.7 percent in 1987) began to decline 
several years before Velázquez’s death and continued afterward. However, 
the CTM’s share of all federal-jurisdiction strikes then recovered somewhat 
between 2005 and 2008 before declining again, reaching a period low of 
just 10.5 percent in 2009.35
34 Rodríguez Alcaine was the long-term leader of the General Union of Mexican Electrical 
Workers (Sindicato Único de Trabajadores Electricistas de la República Mexicana); Gam-
boa Pascoe, a lawyer by training, had long served as leader of the Federal District Workers’ 
Federation (Federación de Trabajadores del Distrito Federal).
35Author’s calculations based on data presented in STPS (www.stps.gob.mx), “Empla-
zamientos y huelgas,” table V.3.6 (consulted on September 3, 2014).
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The strike pattern for the Labor Congress generally paralleled that for 
the CTM, the CT’s most infl uential member. CT affi liates accounted for 
an annual average of 77.5 percent of all strikes occurring over the entire 
1983-2012 period, with a peak of 88.4 percent in 1993 and a low of 21.1 
percent in 2009. That proportion fell to an average of only 48.6 percent per 
year between 2007 and 2012,36 but there was no marked change following 
the UNT’s secession in 1997.37
The factors discussed above do not account well for the decline in strike 
frequency from the mid-1990s onward. However, a signifi cant shift in 
major labor organizations’ perceptions of the utility of strikes as part of 
their overall bargaining strategy may have been an important reason for 
this change. This shift was linked to the particular institutional mechanism 
that the federal government employed to control consumer price infl ation in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s: “pacts” (pactos) that government offi cials 
negotiated with representatives of leading national labor, peasant, and business 
organizations. The De la Madrid administration negotiated the fi rst of these 
agreements in December 1987 to forestall looming hyperinfl ation; succeeding 
administrations renewed them for most of the period through 1995. The 
pacts not only achieved their principal macroeconomic goal, but they also 
regularly brought labor and business leaders together at the bargaining table 
to set national policies regarding wages, prices, and other fi nancial issues. 
Because the pacts centered negotiations at the national level and because 
their provisions included strict limits on wage increases (topes salariales), 
company- and industry-level unions had less scope (and less incentive) to 
strike, even though the formal terms of the pacts did not prohibit them from 
doing so.38 However, this shift in bargaining approach did not necessarily 
reduce labor organizations’ incentives to fi le strike notices as part of their 
efforts to secure other goals. For example, the sharp upturn in the volume of 
federal-jurisdiction strike notices during the Calderón administration resulted 
36 Ibid.
37 The declining relative proportions attributable to the CTM and the CT mirrored the 
dramatic rise in the share of strikes initiated by “independent” (non-CT) labor organizations 
(Ibid.). STPS data do not identify the individual labor organizations in the “independent” 
category. However, the shift began in 2003, well after the formation of the UNT.
38 Author’s interviews with a senior JFCA offi cial, a leading Mexican labor attorney, 
and a former senior JFCA and STPS offi cial, Mexico City, June 23, 24, and 26, 2015, re-
spectively. See Middlebrook, 1995: 263-64 and Zapata Schaffeld, 2007: 120 regarding the 
policy provisions of the pacts.
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in part from intense union competition to win construction contracts during a 
boom in public-sector infrastructure development.39
It is likely that both structural changes weakening the labor movement’s 
overall infl uence (especially changes in its sectorial composition and the 
declining unionization rate)40 and government actions reinforced this shift 
in labor strategy. Arsenio Farrell Cubillas, who headed the STPS from 1982 
through 1994, vigorously resisted strike actions while the De la Madrid 
and Salinas administrations fought infl ation and implemented successive 
pactos. Then, at the very beginning of the Fox administration, the JFCA took 
the controversial decision to declare non-existent a national sugarworkers’ 
strike that had already been underway for more than three weeks. The ruling 
itself cited various legal technicalities and was narrowly based: the fact that 
a CROM-affi liated sugarworkers’ union refused to support the CTM-led 
action meant that slightly fewer than two-thirds of all employees backed 
the strike, as required by the contract-law governing worker-employer 
relations in the industry. However, labor offi cials’ broader goal was to signal 
forcefully to the CTM and other PRI-allied labor groups that they should 
not consider mobilizing against the new PAN government.41 The impact of 
specifi c government actions may, then, help explain the (virtual) disappearance 
of strikes in federal-jurisdiction economic activities since the mid-1990s, 
including why the incidence of federal-jurisdiction strikes began to decline 
notably even before economic policymakers fully controlled infl ation.
Conclusion
This long-term analysis of strikes in Mexico makes three principal 
contributions to the study of Mexican and Latin American labor affairs. 
39 Statistical Appendix; www.stps.gob.mx, “Emplazamientos y huelgas,” tables V.2.1, 
V.2.2; author’s interviews with a senior JFCA offi cial and a senior STPS offi cial, Mexico 
City, June 23 and 29, 2015, respectively.
40 Author’s interviews with a leading Mexican labor attorney and a senior STPS offi cial, 
Mexico City, June 24 and 29, 2015, respectively.
41 Author’s interviews with a leading Mexican labor attorney and a former senior JFCA 
and STPS offi cial, Mexico City, June 24 and 26, 2015, respectively. On the Fox government’s 
handling of the sugarworkers’ strike, including its extensive restructuring of the industry 
contract-law in the aftermath of the strike, see also La Jornada, November 22, December 8, 
10, 2000; January 8, 2001; February 25, 2002.
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First, the fi ndings presented here regarding the impact of presidential policy 
on labor mobilization are more conclusive than those reached by previous 
researchers. Despite variations in different presidential administrations’ 
overall labor policies over the 1941-2012 period, state authorities quite 
consistently sought to limit strikes in economically important federal-
jurisdiction industries. Control over mass political mobilization was, of 
course, a centerpiece of Mexico’s durable postrevolutionary authoritarian 
regime, but it is noteworthy that neither electoral democratization per se nor 
partisan change in control over the presidency had any substantial impact 
on the incidence of strikes. It is conceivable that, had the country’s political 
transition in 2000 brought to power a government committed to far-reaching 
reform of state-labor relations, regime change might have altered this pattern. 
However, despite the Fox administration’s generally moderate labor policies, 
it did not depart from established patterns where strikes were concerned.42 
This outcome underscores the importance of distinguishing among different 
dimensions of democratic regime change in Mexico and elsewhere.
Second, this study goes beyond previous examinations of labor strikes 
in Mexico by demonstrating a statistically signifi cant long-term relationship 
between the rate of infl ation and the frequency of federal-jurisdiction strikes. 
Multivariate regression analysis shows that successive administrations’ 
control over consumer price infl ation is a key reason why the number of 
strikes has remained low since the late 1990s. Neither structural elements 
such as a decline in the unionization rate and changes in the sectorial 
composition of the labor movement, nor important political developments 
in the movement’s leadership and organization, can in themselves account 
for variations over time in the incidence of strikes. However, both structural 
factors that weakened labor movement infl uence and specifi c government 
actions reinforced the shift in major labor organizations’ perceptions of the 
utility of strikes as a bargaining tool that occurred as a consequence of their 
participation in the pacts employed to achieve macroeconomic stabilization 
in Mexico in the late 1980s and early 1990s.   
Finally, these conclusions illustrate the value of strike analysis as a 
research strategy for examining the intersection between economic and 
42 Fox administration offi cials often referred to the low incidence of strikes in their pro-
motional appeals to potential foreign investors. Author’s interviews with a leading Mexican 
labor attorney and a former senior JFCA and STPS offi cial, Mexico City, June 24 and 26, 
2015, respectively.
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political change in Latin America. Whether the specifi c fi ndings reported 
here regarding such issues as the impact of infl ation control on Mexican 
organized labor’s bargaining strategy have parallels in other Latin American 
countries is, of course, a subject for future study. However, one goal of 
this article has been to draw attention to an important but badly neglected 
area of enquiry and bring strikes back onto the labor research agenda for 
Latin America, thus creating a basis for meaningful comparisons between 
strike patterns in Latin America and those in Canada, the United States, 
Western European countries, and elsewhere. In particular, this article seeks 
to promote comparative analysis by assessing Mexican strikes over a seven-
decade period, by employing (with appropriate allowances for the quality of 
the data available) economic and political variables like those used in other 
studies of strikes, and by highlighting the broad range of factors shaping 
changes in labor mobilization over time. 
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Statistical Appendix: Labor Confl ict and Economic Change in 
Mexico, 1941-2012
Year
Federal-ju-
risdiction 
Strike 
Notices
Feder-
al-juris-
diction 
Strikes
Local-juris-
diction 
Strikes
Annual Rate 
of Infl ation 
(percent)
Real Mini-
mum Daily 
Wage Index 
Annual 
Variation in 
Real GDP 
(percent) 
1941 117 17 125 3.2 94.0 9.7
1942 133 19 79 15.6 81.2 5.9
1943 858 569 197 29.7 62.4 3.6
1944 1,103 734 153 27.1 70.8 8.0
1945 263 107 113 6.6 66.4 3.2
1946 NA 24 183 24.6 66.8 6.5
1947 NA 13 117 12.3 59.6 3.6
1948 NA 34 54 6.6 55.6 3.9
1949 NA 35 55 5.2 52.8 6.7
1950 NA 28 54 5.9 50.0 9.7
1951 NA 17 127 13.0 44.4 7.8
1952 NA 29 84 6.6 60.0 4.0
1953 NA 20 142 5.4 56.8 0.3
1954 NA 18 75 5.1 64.4 10.0
1955 NA 13 122 16.0 55.6 8.5
1956 NA 10 149 4.8 73.2 6.9
1957 NA 10 183 5.7 69.2 7.6
1958 NA 11 729 11.4 67.6 5.3
1959 NA 18 361 2.4 66.0 3.0
1960 NA 52 325 5.2 76.0 8.1
1961 NA 42 331 1.8 74.4 4.3
1962 NA 23 702 0.9 89.2 4.5
1963 1,244 36 468 0.9 88.4 7.6
1964 1,532 46 16 2.2 106.4 11.0
1965 1,127 40 27 3.4 102.8 6.2
1966 NA 73 18 4.5 114.4 6.1
1967 1,661 45 33 2.8 111.2 5.9
1968 145 39 117 1.5 124.0 9.4
1969 1,361 40 104 3.0 120.4 3.4
1970 1,512 NA NA 5.9 128.4 6.5
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Year
Federal-ju-
risdiction 
Strike 
Notices
Feder-
al-juris-
diction 
Strikes
Local-juris-
diction 
Strikes
Annual Rate 
of Infl ation 
(percent)
Real Mini-
mum Daily 
Wage Index 
Annual 
Variation in 
Real GDP 
(percent) 
1971 1,632 36 168 3.1 124.8 3.8
1972 2,176 33 174 6.0 139.6 8.2
1973 5,557 57 NA 17.1 130.0 7.9
1974 5,182 55 337 32.7 136.4 5.8
1975 2,155 84 236 14.3 131.2 5.7
1976 6,299 107 547 14.3 158.8 4.4
1977 5,033 128 476 32.1 146.0 3.4
1978 5,572 87 758 18.1 139.2 9.0
1979 6,021 141 795 18.2 135.6 9.7
1980 5,757 93 1,339 26.3 126.8 9.2
1981 6,589 108 1,066 28.0 129.6 8.8
1982 16,095 675 1,971 58.9 123.2 -0.5
1983 13,536 230 978 101.9 92.4 -4.2
1984 9,052 221 548 65.4 85.6 3.6
1985 8,754 125 489 57.7 84.0 2.6
1986 11,579 312 903 86.2 80.4 -3.8
1987 16,141 174 949 131.8 78.4 1.9
1988 7,730 132 618 114.2 62.0 1.3
1989 6,806 118 757 18.6 61.6 3.4
1990 6,395 150 670 26.7 57.6 4.4
1991 7,006 136 438 22.7 53.6 3.6
1992 6,814 156 477 15.5 49.2 2.8
1993 7,531 155 474 9.8 48.0 0.6
1994 7,573 116 472 7.0 100.0 3.7
1995 7,676 96 481 35.0 86.5 -6.9
1996 7,621 51 410 34.4 77.9 5.1
1997 8,047 39 356 20.6 77.4 6.8
1998 7,352 33 245 15.9 78.0 4.9
1999 7,972 32 225 16.6 75.2 3.9
2000 8,282 26 147 9.6 75.8 6.6
2001 6,821 35 219 4.4 76.2 -0.2
2002 6,042 45 213 5.7 76.7 0.8
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Year
Federal-ju-
risdiction 
Strike 
Notices
Feder-
al-juris-
diction 
Strikes
Local-juris-
diction 
Strikes
Annual Rate 
of Infl ation 
(percent)
Real Mini-
mum Daily 
Wage Index 
Annual 
Variation in 
Real GDP 
(percent) 
2003 5,909 44 202 4.0 76.2 1.4
2004 6,122 38 205 5.2 75.1 4.0
2005 6,646 50 224 3.3 75.1 3.2
2006 7,390 55 186 4.0 75.0 5.1
2007 9,045 28 271 3.8 74.5 3.3
2008 10,814 21 150 6.5 73.0 1.3
2009 13,207 19 81 3.6 71.9 -6.8
2010 12,682 11 73 4.4 72.5 3.0
2011 10,905 13 49 3.8 72.8 4.0
2012 9,877 19 54 3.6 73.1 3.8
Sources: Federal-jurisdiction strike notices and strikes: For 1941-93, Middlebrook, 1995: 
table 5.1; for 1994-2012, www.stps.gob.mx. Information on notices may be incomplete for 
1968. Local-jurisdiction strikes: For 1941-89, Middlebrook, 1995: table 5.1; for 1990-94, 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística Geografía e Informática (INEGI), Anuario estadístico, 1992, 
table 21.14; for 1995-2012, Anuario estadístico, 2014, table 10.41. Data are missing for one 
or more states for 1982-83, 1988-89, and perhaps other years. Annual rate of infl ation: For 
1941-93, Middlebrook, 1995: table 6.1; for 1994-2000, Vicente Fox Quesada, Primer informe 
de gobierno, 2001 (Mexico City: Presidencia de la República, 2001), p. 148; for 2001-12, 
Banco de México (www.banxico.org.mx/portal-infl acion/index.html). Real minimum daily 
wage index: The index for 1941-93 (1939 = 100) pertains to the minimum wage in Mexico 
City; the index for 1994-2012 (1994 = 100) is based on the average of the minimum wage 
in three national geographic zones. For both periods, the nominal minimum daily wage was 
defl ated by the infl ation rate reported in this table. The minimum wage data are drawn from: 
for 1941-93, Middlebrook, 1995: table 6.1; for 1994-2012, STPS and Comisión Nacional de 
los Salarios Mínimos (www.stps.gob.mx/bp/secciones/conoce/areas_atencion/web/menu_ 
infsector.html). For the period 1941-71, minimum wages were set only in even-numbered 
years. Minimum wages increased more than once each year during 1973-74, 1976, 1982-98, 
and 2012; annual values are the mean of all increases during a given year. Annual 
variation in real GDP (inflation-adjusted gross domestic product): For 1941-2010, Abraham 
Aparicio Cabrera, “Series estadísticos de la economía mexicana en el siglo XX,” Economía 
Informa, no. 369 (July-August 2011), table 4; for 2011-12, INEGI (www.inegi.org.mx). 
Note: NA = not available. 
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